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Recent scholarship has begun to uncover the nature and extent of the 
reciprocal—and typically adversarial—relationship between William 
Ockham (d. 1347) and Walter Chatton (d. 1343). We now know, for 
example, that Chatton, a slightly younger contemporary of Ockham, is both 
enormously influenced by and, at the same time, highly critical of his older 
colleague; he often takes up precisely those questions Ockham treats (and 
likewise the terminology and conceptual framework in which he expresses 
them) only to reject Ockham’s conclusions.1 We also know that Chatton’s 
criticisms leave their mark on Ockham. Ockham frequently rehearses and 
responds to Chatton’s objections, occasionally refining or even altogether 
revising his views in light of them. Perhaps the best-documented case of 
such influence concerns Ockham’s developing views of concepts, where, in 
direct response to Chatton’s criticisms, Ockham famously abandons his 
early “fictum” theory of concepts in favor of Chatton’s own “mental-act” 
account.2 Although this may be the best-document case, it is by no means 
the only example of such influence—a handful of others have been 
discussed in the literature.3 In this paper, I hope to extend our current 
understanding of the relationship between these two Franciscan thinkers by 
looking in some detail at a debate between them over the objects of 
judgment.  
The broad outlines of Ockham’s place in the development of the later 
medieval debate about judgment are fairly well drawn. Scholars have traced 
                                                 
1
  For a general introduction to Chatton’s philosophy see Keele 2006. A number of studies 
have been made of Chatton’s reaction to (and, typically, criticism of) Ockham’s views. 
See, for example, Keele 2007(a), Cova 1985, Maurer 1984, Kelly 1981, Fitzpatrick 1971, 
Gál 1967, and O’Callaghan 1955.   
2
  For a fuller discussion of Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham and his role in Ockham’s 
eventual change of mind see Gál 1967, Kelly 1981 and Tachau 1988, ch.7. 
3
  Joseph Wey (1980, 39* n.8) provides a list of places in Ockham’s Quodlibetal Questions 
in which Ockham explicitly rehearses arguments or objections offered by Chatton. In 
addition to these, Wey also finds some 68 other textual parallels between Ockham’s 
Quodlibeta and Chatton’s writings. See Wey 1980, 27*. Stephen Brown (1985) presents 
evidence that Ockham draws on Chatton’s Lectura in the course of his discussion of 
Aristotle’s physics.  See also, Keele 2006, § 3.3; Keele 2002, ch. 8; Keele 2007(a). 
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the discussion and controversy generated by Ockham’s account among a 
host of fourteenth-century thinkers at both Oxford and Paris.4 It is well 
established, moreover, that Chatton is among the earliest and most 
vehement critics of Ockham’s account of objects of judgment.5 What has 
gone overlooked in the literature, however, is the fact that Chatton’s 
criticisms of Ockham have an important influence on Ockham himself. Not 
only has this gone unnoticed, scholars have at times thought that Chatton so 
misunderstood Ockham’s position that, in the end, his objections to it fail 
even to apply. In what follows, I argue that Chatton’s criticisms not only 
find their target in Ockham, but that they were felt by Ockham himself to be 
sufficiently forceful as to lead him to radically modify his views. Indeed, 
Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment contains revisions that not 
only resolve the problems Chatton identifies, but that also bring his final 
account of objects of judgment fairly close to Chatton’s own.  
My discussion in what follows divides into three parts. In the first, I 
provide the background necessary for understanding Chatton’s criticisms—
namely, a description of Ockham’s early theory of judgment. I then turn in 
the second part to sketch Chatton’s central objections to that theory and the 
role these objections play in shaping Ockham’s mature views. Here, I argue, 
first, that Ockham initially does defend a view susceptible of Chatton’s 
criticisms and, second, that he is eventually persuaded by these criticisms to 
abandon it. Although the changes Ockham introduces into his final theory 
of judgment significantly reduce the distance between him and Chatton, 
important differences remain. In the third and final section, I consider these 
differences, arguing that they are important both to our understanding of 
Ockham and Chatton’s respective theories of judgment, and to our 
understanding of the subsequent development of the debate about judgment. 
 
1. BACKGROUND: OCKHAM’S EARLY THEORY OF JUDGMENT6 
In order to appreciate Chatton’s objections and the developments in 
Ockham’s account to which they give rise, it is necessary to begin with a 
                                                 
4
  For example, see Nuchelmans 1973, Tachau 1987, Grassi 1991, Perler 1990, 1992, and 
1994, Karger 1995, Brower-Toland 2002, Cesalli 2002. 
5
  Reina 1970 and Keele 2003. 
6
  In what follows, citations of Ockham’s Latin texts are to Ockham 1967-88. I use the 
following abbreviations in referring to particular volumes: Ord. (= Ordinatio. Scriptum in 
Librum Primum Sententiarum); Expos.Praedic. (=Expositio in Liburm Praedicamentorum 
Aristotelis); Expos.Perih. (= Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis); Quodl. (= 
Quodlibeta Septem); SL (= Summa Logicae). Translations are my own. 
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brief overview of Ockham’s early theory of judgment and certain features 
of Chatton’s interpretation of it.7  
Ockham’s views about judgment are framed in terms of a much broader 
theory about the nature of human cognition—a theory that Chatton himself 
largely shares. According to this theory, all thought (that is, intellective 
cognition) forms a kind of mental language—one structured in much the 
way natural language is. Thus, like spoken and written language, the 
language of thought is compositional: it is comprised of simple or atomic 
units (namely, “concepts”), which, via the mental operation of 
“composition,” can be combined in various ways to form complex, 
propositional expressions.8 Accordingly, Ockham divides mental 
expressions into two broad categories: sententential or propositional 
expressions, and the non-sentential terms or units—i.e., subject, predicate, 
and copula expressions—that comprise them.9 Ockham thinks this division 
maps Aristotle’s distinction in the Categories between expressions that are 
“said in combination” (dicuntur cum complexione), and those “said without 
combination” (dicuntur sine complexione). Propositional expressions 
(complexa, propositiones) are those produced by the operation of 
composition and so are appropriately characterized as expressions only 
“said in combination”; by contrast “simple terms” (simplex termini, 
incomplexa) are semantic units that precede and are used in the operation of 
composition.  
On Ockham’s view, the intellect’s formation of a judgment involves not 
only its formulating or “composing” a propositional thought (that is, a 
mental sentence), but also its adopting some stance or attitude with regard 
to it. In order to accommodate this aspect of judgment, Ockham 
distinguishes between two different psychological modes, or types of 
mental act associated with the intellect’s formation of a mental sentence, 
namely, apprehension and judgment. Acts of apprehension are, on his view, 
                                                 
7
  Ockham’s earliest account of judgment is developed in his Ordinatio commentary—
primarily in q.1 of the prologue to it. It is this text that Chatton relies on for his 
interpretation of Ockham. In setting out Ockham’s initial theory of judgment, therefore, I 
will be drawing primarily from his account in this work. I have discussed Ockham’s early 
theory of judgment in more detail elsewhere. See Brower-Toland, 2007.  
8
  According to Ockham: “whatever the intellect can apprehend in a simple act of thinking, 
it can combine (componere) with another thing by saying ‘this is that’.” Ord. Prol., q. 1 
(OTh II, 49). 
9
  Expos.Praedic. Cap. 4, § 1 (OPh II, 148). Ockham argues that while Aristotle was 
speaking primarily about spoken language in the passage from which this distinction is 
taken, he, nevertheless, intended it to apply to mental language as well. 
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acts or states in which the intellect merely considers or entertains a given 
content—whether non-propositional (as when the intellect forms or 
possesses an individual concept) or propositional (as when it entertains a 
mental sentence). Acts of judgment, by contrast, arise only in connection 
with the intellect’s formation of a mental sentence; these are acts or states in 
which the intellect not merely entertains a given content, but takes some 
positive stance with respect to its truth. As Ockham puts it, judgment is an 
act “by which the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its 
assent or dissent.”10  Thus, in keeping with the interpretation of thought as 
an inner, mental language, we can perhaps think of judicative acts as mental 
assertions—that is, acts involving a kind of assertoric force.  
Broadly speaking, acts of judgment fall into one of two categories: 
assent or dissent. Acts of assent and dissent, however, can be further 
subdivided into particular propositional—or, we might say, ‘judicative’—
attitudes, namely, belief, knowledge, doubt, opinion, faith, etc. Thus, when 
one takes something as true (say, by believing, knowing, or opining) she is 
said to assent; when she takes it to be false (say, by disbelieving, or 
doubting) she is said to dissent. Accordingly, a given judicative act may be 
an act of knowledge, belief, doubt and so on depending on the grounds for 
and causes of that act or state. For this reason, Ockham (and Chatton, who 
adopts his terminology and conceptual framework) will often move freely 
between terms like “judgment”, “act of assent”, “act knowledge/belief.” 
In addition to distinguishing between apprehension and judgment, 
Ockham also develops a certain picture of the logical and causal ordering 
among such acts. In particular, he holds that acts of judgment presuppose 
the occurrence of several (logically) prior acts of apprehension.11 For our 
purposes, we need only focus on one part of this account, namely, 
Ockham’s claim that every act of judging presupposes a (logically) prior act 
of apprehending the object judged. As he explains, “an act of judgment with 
respect to a mental sentence presupposes an act of apprehension relating to 
the same thing.”12 The motivation for this claim is just the intuition that one 
does not form a judgment with respect to something without first having 
apprehended or considered that same thing. Indeed, on Ockham’s view, the 
prior act of apprehension is itself partly causally responsible for the 
occurrence of the subsequent judicative act. For, as he sees it, part of what 
explains one’s coming to assent (or dissent) to something is one’s prior 
                                                 
10
  Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 16). 
11
  See, Ockham’s Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 17-21). 
12
  Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 17).  
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consideration or “apprehension” of it. Since, as we shall see, Chatton draws 
heavily on this particular feature of Ockham’s account, it will be useful to 
set it out explicitly as follows: 
 
Ordering Principle: Every act of judgment is always preceded and caused by an 
act of apprehension relating to the same object (at least in the natural order, apart 
from supernatural intervention). 
 
Now, with this much of Ockham’s theory of judgment Chatton is in 
perfect agreement. He shares Ockham’s conception of thought as occurring 
in a type of mental language, and he accepts Ockham’s account of the 
distinction between, and ordering among, acts of apprehension and 
judgment. What he objects to, and what he wants to reject, is Ockham’s 
account of the objects of judgment. Ockham claims that all acts of 
judgment—that is, all acts of believing, knowing, opining, etc.—take 
mental sentences as their object. This claim about objects of judgment is at 
the heart of Ockham’s early theory of judgment; indeed, Ockham’s first 
argument for it comes in the very passage in which he introduces judgment 
as a species of act distinct from apprehension.  
 
The second type of act may be called an act of judgment. It is that act by which 
the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent to it. 
This act is only in relation to a mental sentence (complexi). For our intellect does 
not assent to anything unless we consider it to be true and it does not dissent from 
anything unless we judge it to be false. 13 
 
Because this claim about objects of judgment is so central to Ockham’s early 
theory of judgment and to Chatton’s criticisms of it, it will be useful to pause 
briefly to consider the motivation behind it. 
Ockham’s commitment to the view that mental sentences are objects of 
judgment has a two-fold source: one rooted in his nominalism, the other in his 
understanding of Aristotelian demonstrative science. As the foregoing passage 
makes clear, Ockham thinks that judicative acts or attitudes pertain only to what 
is truth-evaluable, that is, only to what is capable of being true or false. But 
since Ockham’s ontology has no place for abstract propositional entities such as 
sentence types, propositions, or states of affair, he holds that only sentence 
tokens—and, in the first place, mental sentence tokens—are the bearers of truth 
                                                 
13
  Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTh I, 16). 
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or falsity.14 Indeed, he is committed to what we would nowadays think of as a 
nominalist account of truth bearers. As he says, “nothing is true except a 
sentence [token].”15  This, together with understanding of acts of assent as 
relating to what is true (and dissent to what is false), entails that judicative 
attitudes such as belief and knowledge must relate to mental sentences as 
object.  
The other motivation for Ockham’s views about the nature of objects of 
judgment comes from his understanding of the nature of demonstrative 
science (what he refers to as ‘knowledge properly so called’ (scientia 
propria dicta)). Following Aristotle’s account of demonstrative knowledge 
in the Posterior Analytics, Ockham holds that what is known or assented to 
in demonstration is not only something that is true, but also something that 
is necessary and universal. For this same reason, he concludes that the 
(immediate) objects for all demonstrative knowledge (that is, of all scientia) 
must be mental entities since, on his view, there is nothing in extramental 
reality that is universal and, likewise, nothing there (besides God) that is a 
necessary being.16 Mental sentences, however, can possess universal concepts 
(that is, concepts which can be predicated of numerically distinct things) as 
constituent terms, and can be true necessarily (which, on his view, is just to 
be true whenever formed); thus, they alone are the only sort of entity suitable 
to function as objects for demonstrative scientia.17 Accordingly, Ockham’s 
entire theory of demonstration is predicated on the assumption that the 
terms, the premises, and the objects of Aristotelian scientia are mental 
entities—namely, concepts and mental sentences. As he insists: “every 
science (scientia) whatsoever—whether it is real or rational—concerns only 
mental sentences. For it concerns those things which are known (scita) and 
                                                 
14
  Ockham is, of course, well known for his nominalism. In general, he appears willing to 
allow only concrete, particular things (res) falling in the category of substance and quality. 
Thus, he denies the reality not only of universals, but also of abstracta including 
propositions (as they are nowadays conceived) and states of affairs. For an overview of 
Ockham’s ontology see Adams 1987, chs. 1-9. See also Spade 1999 and Normore 1999. 
15
  Quodl. III.8 (OPh IX, 236). Sentences in natural language are also truth-bearers, but 
their truth-value (and, truth conditions) is wholly derivative on that of the corresponding 
sentence in the language of thought. 
16
  Serene 1982, 513.   
17
  As Ockham explains: “In one way something is called ‘necessary’…because it can 
begin and cease to exist by no power; in such a way God alone is necessary…. In another 
way, a sentence called ‘necessary’…which is such that it cannot be false—namely, which 
is true in such a way that, if it is formed it is not false but only true.  And in this sense 
demonstration is of necessities…that is, of sentences which cannot be false but only true.” 
SL III-2, 5 (OPh I, 512). 
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only mental sentences are known (scitur).”18 For convenience, in what 
follows, I refer to Ockham’s position on objects of judgment simply as 
‘Ockham’s position’ where this is shorthand for his view that every act of 
judgment—every act of believing, opining, knowing, demonstrating, etc.—
relates to a mental sentence as its immediate object. 
 Now, it is precisely this position that Chatton wants to reject. Chatton 
denies not only that the objects of demonstrative science are mental 
sentences, but also, and more generally, the view that objects of all 
propositional attitudes are mental entities. Although Chatton is, as we shall 
see, willing to grant that in some special cases mental entities can be said to 
serve as objects of judgment, he insists that, in the normal course of things, 
the objects for judicative attitudes are extramental things (res). In order to 
appreciate the details of Chatton’s criticisms, however, it is important to see 
that, throughout his discussion, he is presupposing a commitment on 
Ockham’s part to a very specific conception of the metaphysical structure of 
mental language—and, so, to a very specific conception of the nature of the 
entities that serve as objects of belief and knowledge. To see what this 
assumption amounts to, I need to say just a word or two about the 
developments in Ockham’s account of concepts. 
When Ockham originally formulates his theory of judgment, he is 
operating with what we might think of as a kind of act-object analysis of 
mental language. According to this analysis, mental sentences (and the 
concepts from which they are composed) are taken to be mind-dependent 
entities—what Ockham refers to as “ficta”, where these are taken to be 
inner thought-objects distinct from and dependent on mental acts directed at 
them.19 As is well known, however, Ockham eventually rejects the act-
object account of mental language—in no small part because of Chatton’s 
criticisms of it. In its place, he adopts Chatton’s own, adverbial (or ‘mental 
act’) analysis of mental language. On this view, concepts and mental 
sentences are not understood as intentional objects of acts of thinking, but 
                                                 
18
  Ord. d.2, q.4 (OTh II, 135). 
19
  Ockham frequently refers to the mental entities that serve as objects of thought as 
‘ficta.’ On his early theory of concepts and mental language, concepts or ficta are construed 
as entities that have a special (mind-dependent) mode of existence—they are, as Ockham 
describes them, ‘objectively existing’ beings. Because, on his early view, concepts are 
characterized as ‘ficta’ and as ‘objectively existing’ his early theory of mental language is 
sometimes referred to in the literature as the “fictum-theory” or as “objective-existence 
theory.” 
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are rather identified with acts of awareness themselves.20 Thus, on 
Ockham’s mature view, mental sentences are no longer understood as 
complex or structured thought-objects, but rather as complex or structured 
mental acts—what both Ockham and Chatton refer to as “complexa 
apprehensiones,” and which we might call ‘propositional apprehensions.’21  
Obviously, such a shift in Ockham’s conception of mental language 
required some amendment to his account of objects of judgment, since it 
entails, at very least, a change in his views about the nature of the mental 
sentences that serve as objects of judgment.22 Chatton simply assumes that 
Ockham means to hold fixed all the central elements of his early theory of 
judgment—and, in particular, the conclusion regarding mental sentences 
serving as objects of judgment—while merely replacing his early account of 
mental sentences with an adverbial, or “mental-act,” analysis of them. Thus, 
on Chatton’s interpretation, Ockham’s considered view is that objects of 
judgment are mental acts, namely, complex or propositional acts of 
apprehension. And it this account of objects of judgment that is the target 
for his criticisms. Indeed, we can think of Chatton’s objections to Ockham’s 
position as an attempt to demonstrate why Ockham’s early views regarding 
objects of judgment cannot be conjoined with an adverbial analysis of 
mental language. 
 
2. CHATTON’S CRITICISMS AND CHATTON’S INFLUENCE 
Chatton takes up the question of objects of judgment in the first article 
of the first question of his Sentences Prologue (hereafter, q.1, a.1).23 
Although he is clearly interested in the objects of judgment generally, the 
focus of his discussion in this context is a question about the objects of 
belief—or, more precisely, of faith. (This focus on the nature of the objects 
of faith is not surprising given the broader context of the discussion: not 
only does it occur in a commentary on a theological textbook, but the 
specific issue with which Chatton is concerned in this part of the 
commentary has to do with the evidentness (evidentia) of the articles of 
                                                 
20
  Hence, Ockham’s later theory of concepts is sometimes referred to as the ‘mental-act’ 
theory. 
21
  As Chatton explicitly says at one point in his discussion: “I am supposing that a mental 
sentence is a propositional apprehension.” Rep. I, Prol. q.1, a.1, 41. 
22
  Although commentators have generally recognized that Ockham is forced to modify his 
early theory of judgment in light of his changing theory of concepts, there is disagreement 
as to what these modifications involve. See Brower-Toland, 2007. 
23
  References to  q. 1, a.1 are to Chatton 1989.  Wey 1989 provides a brief introduction to 
the prologue of Chatton’s Sentence commentary. 
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faith.) The bulk of his discussion in this context is devoted to criticizing 
Ockham’s position. Chatton opens his discussion with a lengthy quotation 
from Ockham’s early account of apprehension and judgment and proceeds 
thereafter to list the (many) places in which Ockham explicitly claims that 
mental sentences are objects for judicative acts.24 Having done this, he goes 
on to develop a series of arguments, all of which are designed to establish 
not only the falsity of Ockham’s position but also truth of his own, namely, 
that “the act of believing (and the act of knowing and opining…) has an 
external thing and not a mental sentence for its object.”25 
In what follows, I want to focus on three lines of criticism that emerge 
over the course of Chatton’s discussion. In each of these, Chatton attempts 
to show that Ockham’s own views regarding the nature of acts of judgment 
and apprehension entail the falsity of his (i.e. Ockham’s) position regarding 
the nature of the objects of such acts.  
 
2.1 Chatton’s Criticisms: The first two lines of criticism take Ockham’s 
ordering principle as their starting point. As I noted earlier, Chatton wholly 
accepts this principle; hence, he accepts Ockham’s account of the logical 
and causal ordering among acts of judgment and apprehension—as he says: 
“I concede that every act of assent naturally presupposes an apprehension of 
its object”.26 But, as we shall see, he also thinks that acceptance of 
Ockham’s ordering principle provides an important first step in proving 
Ockham’s account of judicative objects to be false (and his own to be true). 
To see why this should be the case, let us turn to the first line of 
argument. The argument takes the form of a reductio. Chatton concedes 
Ockham’s ordering principle only to argue that its conjunction with 
Ockham’s position on objects of judgment entails something obviously 
false: namely, that every act of judgment requires higher-order awareness 
(what Chatton himself refers to as “reflexive” apprehension) of one’s own 
mental states. Since Chatton accepts the ordering principle, he thinks the 
result tells against Ockham’s position.  
That the conjunction of the ordering principle and Ockham’s 
position regarding object of judgment has this untoward consequence 
follows from the fact that, on Ockham’s view, the mental sentence that 
serves as object for a given act of judgment is itself a mental act (namely, a 
                                                 
24
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 18-20. Chatton draws exclusively from Ockham’s Ordinatio discussion of 
judgment. 
25
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 20. 
26
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 42.  
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propositional apprehension). But, given Ockham’s ordering principle, it 
follows that 
 
one does not assent to some mental sentence unless he first apprehends it…This is 
because, as he [namely, Ockham] proves, the apprehension of a mental sentence 
is the cause of the [judgment] by which the intellect assents to the sentence. 27 
 
Clearly, if the sentences that serve as objects for judgment are propositional 
apprehensions, and if every judgment presupposes an apprehension of the 
object judged, it follows that every act of judgment—that is, any act of 
believing, knowing, opining, etc.—involves some kind of higher-order 
awareness of lower-order acts. But this, as Chatton goes on to argue, is 
implausible insofar as it conflicts with our experience of the 
phenomenology of judging. As Chatton repeatedly points out, we it seems 
clear that we form judgments all the time without any second-order 
awareness of our mental states. Given this, it is likewise clear that mental 
sentences cannot be said to be the object for every act of judgment.  
To illustrate the point, Chatton takes as an example a case in which 
someone forms the belief (i.e. comes to assent) that God is three and one.  
The formation of this belief or judgment begins with an act of 
(propositional) apprehension—that is, with the formation of the thought or 
mental sentence ‘God is three and one.’ This is followed by an act of 
judgment; in this case, a there is an assent in which the subject affirms or 
accepts the sentence as true. Now, as Chatton points out,    
 
when the intellect, in forming this mental sentence ‘God is three and one’, assents with 
an act of belief, that act [of believing] does not presuppose an apprehension of the 
mental sentence ‘God is three and one.’ … This is because the assent requires on the 
part of the intellect only that the mental sentence be formed in the intellect. It does not 
require that any mental sentence be apprehended. 28 
 
If, as Ockham claims, it were true that a mental sentence were the object of 
the belief that God is three and one, it would follow (given Ockham’s 
ordering principle) that to form such a belief one would not only have to 
formulate the thought ‘God is three and one’, but would also have to have a 
higher-order awareness of that thought. But this is implausible. As Chatton 
insists, it seems we could form such a belief without any reflexive 
awareness of our own thoughts. Of course, if this is right, Ockham’s 
                                                 
27
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 17. 
28
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 39. 
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position is mistaken: not every judgment has a mental sentence as its 
object.29  Indeed, on Chatton’s view, in most cases they do not.   
So much for Chatton’s first line of criticism.  If we turn now to the 
second, we can see that, like the first, it takes Ockham’s ordering principle 
as its point of departure. This time, however, Chatton argues not merely 
against Ockham’s position, but for a positive claim of his own: “assent has 
for its object an extramental thing or things (res)” (where by ‘things’ 
Chatton has in mind individual substances and/or their attributes). To see 
how Chatton arrives at this positive claim using Ockham’s ordering 
principle, consider, once again, his account of the formation of the belief 
that God is three and one. As we’ve just seen, to believe or judge that God 
is three and one is just a matter of one’s forming the mental sentence ‘God 
is three and one’ followed by a subsequent act of assent. What Ockham’s 
ordering principle tell us, however, is that the object of the assent is the 
object of the act of apprehension that precedes and causes it. It follows, 
therefore, that whatever serves as the object of the propositional 
apprehension ‘God is three and one’ is the object of the assent in question. 
Chatton then proceeds to argue that since “the mental sentence is an 
apprehension of God,” we are led by Ockham’s own ordering principle to 
conclude that God (and not a mental sentence) is the object of the belief that 
God is three and one.  
Chatton holds, in general, that what is cognized in a given act of 
propositional cognition is some extra-mental object (res)—specifically, 
substances and, perhaps, some property of them. As he sees it, the object 
(or, as he often characterizes it, the “significate”) of sentences in the 
language of thought is just the entity (or entities) that is cognized by its 
constituent terms. And, on his view, what is cognized by each of the terms 
of a mental sentence is some extramental object. As he explains: 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
  As Chatton puts it elsewhere: “Supposing that a mental sentence [is present] in the 
intellect, and ruling out any apprehension of the mental sentence (omni apprehesione 
complexi circumscripta), the intellect is inclined to assent. But, having ruled out any 
apprehension of the metal sentence, [it is clear that] the intellect does not assent to the 
sentence. … [This is clear] since according to [Ockham] (and according to the truth of the 
matter) the intellect does not assent without a cognition or apprehension [of that to which it 
assents]. Therefore, if the mental sentence is not apprehended, the intellect does not assent 
to it.”  Prol. q.1, a.1, 21.  
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a mental sentence is a certain propositional cognition. Thus, it is a cognition of 
just that which is cognized through the subject, or the predicate or the copula [of 
that mental sentence]. For its being a cognition accrues to it through its parts—but 
its parts are cognitions of an extra-mental thing.30 
 
What is more, Chatton can see no reason why Ockham would disagree with 
this claim about the objects of propositional cognitions given his acceptance 
of Chatton’s own adverbial analysis of mental sentences and of the concepts 
that comprise them.  
Of course, if this is right and the object of the complex or propositional 
apprehension that precedes and causes a given act of assent (or dissent) is 
an extramental entity it follows that the object of the judgment is likewise 
something extramental. As Chatton insists, 
 
if we suppose that the intellect forms a sentence that signifies an external thing, 
and suppose further that it does not apprehend that sentence (which assumption is 
plausible since the parts of that sentence are not apprehensions of the whole 
sentence), then (assuming all of this), I claim that this mental sentence is suited to 
cause an assent, but that it does not cause an assent that relates to that sentence [as 
its object]. For by assumption, the sentence is not what is apprehended. Therefore, 
the assent has for its object the external thing (or things) that are signified by that 
sentence.31 
 
In the end, therefore, Chatton contends that Ockham’s account of the 
relations which obtain between apprehension and judgment tell not only 
against his own conclusion about the objects of judgment but also in favor 
of Chatton’s alternative account. “On the basis of [Ockham’s] own claims,” 
he says, “I have my principle point in this question—namely, that the assent 
                                                 
30
  As Chatton proceeds to explain: “An external thing (res) is cognized through the 
subject, and the predicate and the copula since those terms are cognitions of an external 
thing. Throughout the whole time in which the sentence signifying an external thing is 
formed in the mind, the external thing is cognized—sometimes by the subject of the 
sentence, sometimes by the copula, sometimes by the predicate.” Prol. q.1, a.1, 24.  That 
Chatton does indeed think that what is apprehended by a mental sentence is a thing (i.e. an 
individual substance or attribute) one has only to consider his own examples. For instance 
when considering what is signified by the mental sentence ‘God is three and one,’ he 
claims that it is just God. “This is because that assent [viz. to the mental sentence God is 
three and one] requires on the part of the intellect only that that mental sentence be formed 
in the intellect. It does not require that any mental sentence is apprehended, because each 
part of that sentence is an apprehension of God and not of any accident in the mind” Prol. 
q.1, a.1, 39. God is the object for a number of other theological articles: ‘God is incarnate,’ 
‘God is God,’ etc. 
31
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 26. 
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that the intellect has when it forms a mental sentence signifying an 
extramental thing has that thing (and not the mental sentence) for its 
immediate object.”32  
All of this leaves open the possibility that there are, nevertheless, some 
cases in which we do direct attention toward our own mental states and 
even go on to form second-order thoughts or judgments about them. 
Chatton is perfectly willing to acknowledge this possibility. Indeed, he 
explicitly allows that sometimes judgments do have mental sentences as 
their object. Cases in which an act of judgment relates to a mental sentence 
as its object are, on Chatton’s view, cases in which one apprehends a given 
mental sentence and then goes on to make some judgment regarding its 
truth. Thus, for example, an act of assent that is directed at a mental 
sentence as its object will be an act in which one judges (believes, knows, 
etc.) that the sentence is true. Such judgments are, thus, not about or 
principally directed at some thing in extramental reality, but are rather 
directed at or about one’s own mental acts.  
In order to accommodate this possibility, Chatton thinks it is necessary 
to draw a distinction, already anticipated above, between two kinds of 
judgment or assent: those that are about extramental things (res) and so 
require no awareness or apprehension of one’s own mental acts or states, 
and those which are about one’s own mental acts or states (i.e. about 
sentences in one’s language of thought) and so do require some sort of 
higher-order or reflexive awareness of them. Accordingly, Chatton 
explicitly distinguishes between  
 
[1] the assent which the intellect has when it forms a mental sentence that 
immediately signifies an external thing—such as when one forms the sentence 
‘God is three and one’—and [2] the assent the intellect has when it forms a mental 
sentence that immediately signifies another mental sentence—such as when one 
forms this mental sentence ‘the article of faith [e.g., ‘God is three and one’] is 
true.’.33  
 
As Chatton points out, one sort of assent (call it a ‘non-reflexive’ assent) is 
caused or prompted by the intellect’s formation of a first-order mental 
sentence regarding some extramental thing (e.g. ‘God is three and one’), 
and, so, has that thing (e.g., God) as object. The other sort of assent, which 
Chatton labels ‘reflexive’ assent, is caused by the intellect’s formation of a 
second-order or meta-linguistic mental sentence (e.g. ‘‘God is three and 
                                                 
32
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 38. 
33
  Prol.q.1, a.1, 38. 
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one’ is true’), and has (the first-order) mental sentence (e.g. ‘God is three 
and one’) as object.   
Obviously, the introduction of this distinction involves conceding to 
Ockham that some judgments do have mental sentences as objects. Chatton 
draws on this concession, however, to bolster his own position regarding 
objects of judgment. This brings us to the third line of criticism he pursues 
against Ockham. Here, after conceding that in some cases mental sentences 
do serve as objects of judgment, Chatton goes on to insist that the very 
possibility of such reflexive judgments presupposes the truth of his own 
view about the objects of non-reflexive judgments. This is because, Chatton 
maintains, every occurrence of a reflexive judgment directed at a mental 
sentence as object, requires the (logically) prior occurrence of a non-
reflexive act of judgment that has an extramental thing as its object. As he 
explains: 
 
Assent to a mental sentence necessarily presupposes [a prior act of] assent to the 
thing (res) signified by that sentence. This is the case because assenting that it is 
the case in reality (as the sentence signifies it to be) is prior to assenting that the 
sentence itself is true.34  
 
On Chatton’s view one cannot judge that a thought or mental sentence is 
true unless one has first formed a belief or judgment about how things stand 
in reality. To judge a sentence (mental or otherwise) to be true is to judge 
that it corresponds to reality. Hence, if one assents to a mental sentence—
that is, if one believes or judges that one’s thoughts (or apprehensions) are 
true, this must be because one has already formed a belief or judgment 
about things in the extramental world. Thus, the formation of a judgment 
directed at a mental sentence presupposes a prior judgment that is not 
directed at a mental sentence—indeed, it presupposes a prior judgment 
about things in extramental reality. Hence, the concession that is possible 
for a judgment to have a mental sentences as object by itself, entails the 
falsity of Ockham’s position because it entails that not every act of 
judgment has mental sentences as object.35 
                                                 
34
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 27. 
35
  Thus, as Chatton explains, at one point, even if one apprehends and assents that the 
article ‘God is three and one is true’, this “does not entail that he first assents that the 
article is true. Rather it is the reverse. Assenting that an article is true requires that one 
[first] assent that something is the case in reality. And then, with the assent that relates to 
the external thing remaining in place, by virtue of that assent it then appears evident [to the 
person] that the article is true.”  Prol. q.1, a.1, 42. 
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Although Chatton raises a number of other objections for Ockham’s 
account, what we’ve seen already will be sufficient for establishing his 
influence on the subsequent development of Ockham’s views.  
 
2.2 Chatton’s Influence: Chatton’s criticisms, as we’ve seen, are predicated 
on the assumption that Ockham continues to defend his early conclusion 
about mental sentences serving as objects of judgment even when his views 
about the nature of mental language itself began to evolve. Some 
commentators have questioned the accuracy of this assumption, however.36  
There is evidence to suggest that once Ockham comes to accept the 
adverbial analysis of concepts and mental sentences, he also abandons his 
early claim that mental sentences serve as objects for every act of 
judgment.37 In the Quodlibetal Questions—a work which contains 
Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment and which also reflects his 
full acceptance of the adverbial analysis of mental language—Ockham 
explicitly claims that “an act of assent by which something is known to be 
such-and-such or known not to be such-and-such…does not have a mental 
sentence (complexum) as its object.”38  In fact, Ockham’s treatment of 
judgment throughout his Quodlibetal Questions reflects a consistent and 
wholesale rejection of his early contention that mental sentences are the 
                                                 
36
  This was, in fact, my own view for a time. See also Karger (1995, 183) who contends 
that Chatton’s arguments against Ockham are “misleadingly presented” and, in general 
characterizes Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham in terms of their “unfairness” to Ockham. 
Apparently, Adam Wodeham—a contemporary of both Ockham and Chatton—seems to 
have shared much the same view. He too denounces Chatton as being unfair to Ockham on 
this score. See Karger 1995, n. 46. 
37
  Ockham’s transition from the act/object or ‘fictum’ theory of concepts to the adverbial 
or ‘mental-act’ theory proceeds in three stages: in the earliest stage he advances the fictum 
theory, in the middle stage he defends both the fictum and the mental act theory as equally 
plausible views, and in the final stage he wholly endorses the mental-act theory. The 
earliest drafts of his Sentences commentary—that is, his Reportatio commentary and the 
early draft of his Ordinatio—belong to the early period. To the middle period belong his 
later additions to the Ordinatio commentary and his commentary on the Perihermenias.  
The Quodlibetal Questions, the Questions on the Physics, and the Summa Logicae all 
belong to the last period. For relative dating of these texts, see Boehner 1946 and 1951and 
Leff 1975, ch. 2. I have argued at length elsewhere (Brower-Toland, 2007) that Ockham’s 
views about judgment also undergo a three-stage development—one corresponding to each 
of the three phases in the development of his theory of concepts. The view Chatton is 
attacking corresponds to the view that Ockham endorses during the second phase of his 
thinking about judgment. Thus, on my analysis, Chatton plays a role in Ockham’s move 
from the second to the third and final theory of judgment. 
38
  Quodl. III, q. 8 (OTh IX, 233-234). 
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objects for all acts of judgment. But, if this is right—and Ockham never 
attempted to combine an adverbial analysis of mental language with his 
early theory of judgment—it follows that Chatton either misrepresents the 
views of his colleague (and, so, unfairly criticizes them) or is simply 
mistaken about the way they develop.   
In point of fact, however, Chatton’s criticisms clearly do find a target in 
Ockham’s developing views about judgment. To see this, we need only 
consider some of Ockham’s remarks in his commentary on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione—a work written just a few years before his Quodlibetal 
Questions were completed. In this work, Ockham defends precisely the 
view that Chatton criticizes.39 What is more, it looks as if Ockham comes to 
abandon this theory precisely in response to Chatton’s criticisms. Thus, if 
Ockham does eventually develop a view immune to Chatton’s criticisms, 
this does not owes to any misunderstanding or unfairness on Chatton’s part; 
rather, it owes to the fact that Ockham himself fully appreciated the force of 
Chatton’s objections and revised his view precisely in response to them. 
 The nature and extent of Chatton’s influence can best be seen if we 
begin by looking briefly at Ockham’s remarks about judgment in the 
prologue to his De Interpretatione commentary. Ockham’s discussion in 
this context represents his earliest attempt to modify his initial account of 
the objects of judgment in order to accommodate the adverbial model of 
mental language.40 In the prologue of the commentary, Ockham surveys a 
variety of views about the nature of concepts and of mental language, 
turning specifically in Section 6 to a discussion, and a limited defense, of 
the adverbial model of mental language. Over the course of his discussion, 
Ockham specifically addresses a question about what, on this way of 
                                                 
39
  Although Chatton does not actually cite this work when criticizing Ockham’s account of 
judgment, it is a work which dates to roughly the same period as the redaction of the 
Ordinatio commentary (on which Chatton does rely).  What is more, there is good reason 
to think that Chatton knew of—perhaps was even present at—Ockham’s lectures on De 
Interpretatione. This is because Ockham delivered his lectures on the ‘old logic’ in 1321-
22 while staying at the Franciscan studium in London and it is widely supposed that 
Chatton was at the London studium during this same time. For discussion of the issue of 
Chatton’s presence in London, see Gál 1967, 53*-56* and Courtenay 1990. 
40
  As noted earlier, at this stage in his thinking, Ockham has not wholly abandoned his 
early ‘fictum’ theory of concepts, he is simply now willing to entertain the mental-act 
account alongside it. In this particular section of the prologue to the De Interpretatione, he 
is attempting to develop an account of judgment that would accommodate the mental act 
account of concepts, but does so without wholly endorsing the mental-act account of 
concepts. 
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thinking about mental language, serves as object for judgment. His response 
is clear: objects of judgment are mental sentences—where these are 
understood as acts of propositional apprehension. As he explains: 
 
To apprehend a mental sentence is nothing other than to form a mental sentence. 
… But, if we speak of an act of knowing some mental sentence, then it can be said 
that this act is an act that is distinct from the act [of apprehension] that is the 
mental sentence. And, therefore, when some mental sentence is known, there are 
two acts of the intellect occurring simultaneously, namely, the act that is the 
sentence and the other act by means of which the mental sentence is known. Nor 
does one ever find Aristotle denying that two acts of the intellect can exist at the 
same time in the intellect, especially when it comes to acts ordered in the way 
these are: mental sentence and act of knowing it.41 
 
What this passage shows is that, when Ockham first begins to entertain the 
adverbial model of mental language, he clearly does continue to hold fixed 
his earlier views about mental sentences serving as objects of judgment. He 
is, at least at this stage in his thinking, willing to accept both that mental 
sentences can be taken as acts or modes of propositional apprehension, and 
that mental sentences, so understood, function as objects of judgment. 
Indeed, as the foregoing passage makes clear, Ockham initially sees nothing 
untoward in conjunction of the adverbial analysis of mental language and 
his earlier claim about objects of judgment.  
When we turn to his most mature treatment of judgment in the 
Quodlibetal Questions, however, it becomes evident that the objections 
Chatton raises against this account have had their impact.  In fact, the 
revisions Ockham makes in his account of objects of judgment appear to be 
a direct response to Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1, and to take a great deal 
from Chatton’s discussion in that context.42  
                                                 
41
  Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 6 (OPh II, 358). Cf. Section 12 (OPh II, 375) where Ockham 
says much the same thing.  
42
  The dates assigned to Ockham’s Quodlibetal disputations are 1322-1324. Although 
Ockham’s discussion of judgment in the Quodlibetal Questions makes perfectly clear that 
he is not only aware of Chatton’s objections, but even drawing material directly from 
Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1, the precise means by which he had access to this material 
is a bit difficult to pin down. This is because the only extant version of Chatton’s q.1, a.1 
comes from the Lectura version of his Sentences prologue and the dates for the completion 
of the Lectura range from 1324-1330. It is not unreasonable, however, to suppose that 
Chatton was already revising the prologue for the Lectura even as he was still giving his 
Reportatio lectures—namely during the years of 1321-23. And since Ockham and Chatton 
were likely together at the London studium during these years, it may be that Chatton was 
composing the Lectura version of the prologue at roughly the same time Ockham was 
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Consider, for example, what Ockham says when, in his Quodlibetal 
Questions, he returns once again to the question about the objects of 
judgment. As noted earlier, he responds here by rejecting the claim that 
judicative acts always take mental sentences as their object. Significantly, 
however, he gives precisely Chatton’s reasons for doing so: he claims that 
acceptance of such a view would entail something implausible, namely, that 
judgments would involve some kind of higher -order, reflexive 
awareness of one’s own mental states. Thus, in Quodlibet III.8 Ockham 
says that, in the ordinary case, an act of judgment 
 
does not have a mental sentence (complexum) as its object because such an act is 
able to exist through the mere formulation of a mental sentence and without any 
apprehension of a mental sentence. For this reason, it cannot be an act of assenting 
to a mental sentence. Furthermore, when an ordinary person knows that a rock is 
not a donkey, he is not thinking about a mental sentence at all, and as a result he is 
not assenting to a mental sentence.43 
 
These remarks make perfectly clear that Ockham is both aware of and 
accepts as decisive Chatton’s argument against his earlier theory. For he 
explicitly acknowledges that to claim that a judgment relates to a mental 
sentences as object requires that such a judgment involves reflexive 
awareness of one’s own mental states and, likewise, acknowledges that in 
the normal course of things we form judgments without any consciousness 
of our own thoughts or mental acts. He concludes with Chatton, therefore, 
that mental sentences cannot, in general, serve as objects of judgment. 
What is more, Ockham is now even willing to allow that there is a sense 
(albeit, a qualified or restricted one) in which we can say that things (res)—
namely, substances and accidents—in extramental reality are objects of 
judgment. After all, in many cases, when we form a judgment we are aware 
                                                                                                                            
engaged in his Quodlibetal disputations and, therefore, that Ockham had access to the 
material during the period he was presiding over these disputations. Or, it may be that 
Ockham incorporated material from Chatton’s prologue into his Quodlibets some time after 
the disputations themselves were completed.  After all, Ockham is thought to have revised 
and completed his Quodlibetal Questions some years after the disputations themselves 
were held—perhaps during 1324-1326 while he was in Avignon.  Or, finally, it is even 
possible that Ockham had access only to the earlier Reportatio version of Chatton’s Q.1, a. 
1, but that the Lectura version is a simply a close parallel of the Reportatio discussion. For 
a discussion of the respective dating of Ockham’s Quodlibeta Septem and Chatton’s 
Reportatio and Lectura, see Wey 1967, 53*-56*; Wey 1980, 36*-38; Keele 2006, § 1; 
Keele, 2007(b).   
43
  Quodl. III.8 (OTh IX, 233-234). 
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of and judging about external things and, in this sense, the things 
themselves can be said to be the objects of judgment. Consider, for 
example, what Ockham says in connection with the previous example of 
judging that a rock is not a donkey: 
 
Although it is by means of a mental sentence formulated in the intellect that one 
affirms and knows that things are such and such in reality or that things are not 
such and such in reality, one nonetheless does not perceive this [mental sentence]. 
Instead, the act of assenting has as its object things outside the mind, namely, a 
rock and a donkey.44    
 
Here Ockham concedes not only that this judgment involves no 
apprehension of the mental sentence that precedes and causes it, but also 
that since the judgment does clearly involve some awareness or 
apprehension of extramental things—namely, rocks and donkeys—these 
things can be said to be its objects. As he proceeds to explain: “by means of 
an assent of this sort I apprehend things (res) outside the mind, since every 
assent is an apprehension but not vice versa.”45 Thus, to the extent that 
objects of judgment are those entities that are apprehended in the 
judgment—or in one or more of the acts leading up to the formation of the 
judgment—Ockham is willing to grant Chatton’s view that extramental 
entities—that is, things such as rocks and donkeys—can serve as objects of 
judgment. Thus, a bit later in this same discussion, when considering the 
question of objects of faith or belief, Ockham explicitly concedes Chatton’s 
own conclusion about the object of the belief that God is three and one. As 
Ockham puts it: “by such an act it is believed that God is three persons; and 
the object of that act (in the sense in which it has an object) is God.”46  
Although Ockham holds that substances or accidents can be called 
objects of judgment only in a restricted or qualified sense, the extent of 
Chatton’s influence is evident, nonetheless. Not only does Ockham now 
reject his earlier conclusion about mental sentences serving as objects for all 
acts of judgment while also granting the view that things can serve (in some 
sense at least) as objects, but he also appropriates Chatton’s distinction 
between the two different types of judgment, that is the distinction between 
non-reflexive and reflexive assent.47  
                                                 
44
  Ibid. (OTh IX, 234).  
45
  Ibid. 
46
  Ibid. (OTh IX, 236). 
47
  The distinction that Ockham, following Chatton, draws here between two acts of 
judgment is one that he comes to apply to other mental acts as well. Indeed, in a number of 
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Indeed, one of the most distinctive features of Ockham’s treatment 
judgment in the Quodlibetal Questions is the appearance of this 
distinction—it shows up only in his most mature treatment of judgment and 
it matches exactly the distinction Chatton draws between acts of assent that 
require no awareness or apprehension of one’s own mental acts or states 
(and so do not have mental sentences as objects) and those which do. In 
fact, at every point in the Quodlibetal Questions at which Ockham treats 
questions about judgment he begins his discussion by marking this very 
distinction. Consider, for example, his remarks at the outset of Quodlibet 
IV.16: 
I claim, as was explained in another Quodlibet, that acts of assenting are of two 
sorts. One sort is an act by which I assent that some thing is or is not such-and-
such in the way that I assent to its being the case that God exists, and to its being 
the case that God is three and one, and to its being the case that God is not the 
devil. … The second sort of assent is an act by which I assent to something, with 
the result that the act of assenting does bear a relation to something, in the way 
that I assent to or dissent from a mental sentence (complexum) For example, I 
assent to the mental sentence ‘a human being is an animal’, since I consider it to 
be true. 48 
 
Although there is a great deal going on in this passage, one thing that 
emerges perfectly clearly is that Ockham has adopted Chatton’s distinction 
between non-reflexive and reflexive assent, and does so in order to make 
just the same point Chatton did—namely, that mental sentences can be the 
objects only of reflexive acts of assent. Indeed, like Chatton, Ockham now 
wants to distinguish between cases in which one apprehends and forms 
thoughts and judgments about things in extramental reality—for instance, 
about God and the devil, that the one is not the other, say—and cases in 
which one apprehends and forms (higher-order) thoughts and judgments 
about one’s own (lower-order) thoughts—for example, about the mental 
                                                                                                                            
places throughout his Quodlibetal Questions Ockham marks a distinction between what he 
calls “direct” and “reflexive” mental acts, claiming that  “an act by which we understand an 
object outside the mind is called a direct act, and an act by which a direct act itself is 
understood is called a reflexive act.” (Quodl. II.12 (OTh IX, 165)) What Ockham here 
refers to as ‘direct’ mental acts are just first-order acts involving an awareness only of 
items in the extra-mental world; reflexive acts, by contrast, are second-order as they 
involve awareness of other, first-order mental acts. Although Ockham does not restrict this 
distinction to acts of judgment, and while he never uses the terms “direct” and “reflexive” 
in the context of his treatments of judgment, it is clear, nevertheless, that the distinction 
between two types of assent corresponds to his distinction between direct and reflexive 
mental acts. 
48
  OTh IX, 376-377 
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sentence ‘a human being is an animal’, that that sentence is true, say. Since 
cases of the former sort are about things in extramental reality and not about 
sentences in one’s head, they clearly require no reflexive awareness of such 
sentences. As Ockham goes on to explain: 
 
without exception it is never the case that the first sort of assent necessarily 
presupposes an apprehension of a mental sentence, since this sort of assent is not 
an assent relating to a mental sentence as object. Rather this assent presupposes 
apprehension of singular thing, though the intellect does not assent to singular 
things. By contrast, the second sort of assent, speaking naturally, does necessarily 
presuppose apprehension of a mental sentence…and the reason is that this sort of 
assent has a mental sentence for its object.49  
 
Thus, insofar as it is only reflexive judgments that are about mental 
sentences, it is also only reflexive judgments that have mental sentences as 
object. Here again, Chatton’s influence on Ockham is unmistakable.50 
 
3.  CHATTON AND OCKHAM ON THE OBJECTS AND STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENT 
 
To this point, I have been emphasizing the similarities between 
Ockham’s final treatment of judgment and Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1 
in order to call attention to Chatton’s influence on Ockham.  What we have 
seen is, I think, sufficient to establish not only that Ockham does, at one 
point, advance precisely the view Chatton criticizes, but also that he is 
moved by these criticisms to revise this view—taking much from Chatton’s 
own account in the course of doing so. Yet, while such revisions do bring 
Ockham’s account much closer to Chatton’s, the remaining disagreements 
between them should not be overlooked. Indeed, as I now want to show, 
                                                 
49
  Ibid. 
50
  Not only can Chatton’s influence be seen in the changes Ockham introduces to his final 
theory of judgment, it can also be seen in the structure the discussion itself. For example, in 
Quodlibet III.8, the three points Ockham considers in connection with the first of the 
objection he discusses turn out to be precisely the first, second, and seventh principle 
objections raised by Chatton in q.1, a.1 (pp. 21-22, 27 ,29-30). Likewise, all three 
objections Ockham treats in Quodlibet IV.16 are points raised by Chatton. In Quodlibet 
V.6, a number of arguments Ockham adduces in favor of each of his two theses have a 
close parallel in Chatton’s discussion. For instance, the argument Ockham offers in favor 
of the conclusion that reflexive acts of judgment must be distinct from reflexive acts of 
apprehension is roughly the same argument Chatton offers in response to the first objection 
brought against his position (Prol. q.1, a.1, 33ff.). There, however, he’s using the argument 
to argue for a distinction among non-reflexive apprehensions and judgments. 
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there are still a number of important differences between Chatton and 
Ockham’s views about both objects and acts of judgment.  
 
3.1 Objects of Judgment: As we’ve seen, Ockham concedes Chatton’s point 
that in cases of first-order, non-reflexive acts of judging what is 
apprehended is not a mental sentence, but rather one or more extramental 
things. And insofar as extramental entities are what is cognized or 
apprehended in such judgments Ockham allows that such things can be said 
to be the ‘objects’ of judgment. Where he diverges from Chatton, however, 
is in his insistence that extramental things are not objects of judgment in the 
more strict sense of being “that which known” (or believed) or, more 
generally, that to which assent or dissent is given. Consider his remarks in a 
passage cited just above from Quodlibet IV.16 where he discussing the 
objects of first-order acts of faith: 
 
by [this sort of act] I assent that some thing is or is not such-and-such—in the way 
that I assent to its being the case that God exists, and to its being the case that God 
is three and one, and to its being the case that God is not the devil. I do not, 
however, assent to God or to the devil; rather I assent to its being the case that 
God is not the devil. Hence, strictly speaking, I assent to nothing through this act 
even though I apprehend God and the devil through this act.  (Italics added.) 
 
Drawing on Chatton’s own example of the belief that God is three and one, 
Ockham argues that although what is apprehended is God (and not a mental 
sentence about God), nevertheless, one does not “assent to God”. Indeed, 
Ockham thinks that, strictly speaking, in cases of first-order judgments 
there is “nothing”—that is, no entity or object—to which the act of judging 
relates as what is assented to. Although this may seem an odd claim, it is, 
nevertheless, one Ockham returns to a number of times. In fact, he makes 
much the same point in Quodlibet III.8 when talking about the first-order 
judgment ‘A rock is not a donkey.’ As we’ve seen, Ockham grants that “this 
act of assent has as its object things outside the mind, namely, a rock and a 
donkey,” yet, he also insists that “it is not, nevertheless, the case that a rock 
is known or that a donkey is known... Indeed, if you ask whether there is 
something known by this act, I reply that, properly speaking, it should not 
be said that something is known by this act.”51 Ockham’s point here is not 
that the act in question is empty or devoid of content; rather his point is 
simply that the relation in which it stands to extramental things (in this case, 
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rocks and donkeys) is not the relation of “being known” (or believed) or 
“being assented to.”   
Thus, while Ockham is willing to grant Chatton’s point that things such 
as rocks and donkeys (or God and the devil) can be called objects of 
judgments in the sense they are the objects toward which one’s attention is 
directed in judgment (or, in Chatton’s terms, what is “apprehended”), he 
also wants to resist saying that such entities are objects which can be judged 
or to which assent (or dissent) can be given. Indeed, as he says at one point, 
“there is no such thing as assent with respect to a thing (res), since it makes 
no sense to say that I assent to a rock or to a cow.”52 The emphasis 
Ockham’s puts on this point is clearly an attempt to distance himself from 
Chatton’s own account of objects of judgment. Chatton, as we’ve seen, is 
not only perfectly comfortable with the claim that, in cases of non-reflexive 
judgments, the intellect “assents to a thing,” but he goes further to insist that 
this what one must say. After all, he argues, if “the intellect does not [in 
such cases] assent to a mental sentence, it therefore assents to a thing (or to 
things) signified by the sentence.”53  And, to his mind, there is nothing 
particularly worrisome about this. For, as he explains, it is “no more absurd 
[to say] that assent has for its immediate object one thing (or many things) 
than [to say] that the thing (or things) are signified simultaneously by the 
sentence that the intellect forms in assenting.”54  
This difference between what Chatton and Ockham are each willing to 
count as “objects” of judgment owes, ultimately, to the fact that each 
thinker approaches the question about objects of judgment with a different 
set of interests and aims in mind. For Chatton, the question about objects of 
judgment is, ultimately, a question about the broadly intentional or semantic 
features of mental language. On his view, therefore, the objects of judgment 
are whatever is apprehended or “signified” by the mental sentence that 
precedes and causes it. Thus, for him, the question about objects of 
judgment is, fundamentally, a question about the nature of the entities that 
serves as the referent or ‘significate’ for sentential expressions (namely, 
mental sentences). And, as we’ve seen, he thinks that mental sentences refer 
just to the thing (or things) to which their subject and predicate expressions 
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  Quodl., IV.16 (OTh IX, 380) 
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  Prol. q.1, a.1, 21. 
54
  Prol. q.1, a.1, 30. 
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refer—where these include substances and/or their attributes. Hence, these 
are objects of judgment.55 
Ockham approaches the question about objects of judgment from a 
rather different set of concerns. From the start, he is thinking of objects of 
judgment in terms of truth and, in particular, in terms of truth-bearers.56 
Thus, on his view, properly or “strictly” speaking, only what is true can be 
an object of assent—since only what is true is said to be “known” (scitum), 
“believed” (creditum), or, in general, an object for assent (or dissent). And 
since, mental sentences are, even on his mature view, the primary bearers of 
truth and falsity he is resistant to the notion that ordinary things (res) are 
objects of assent in any strict sense. Indeed, Ockham goes so far as to insist 
that it is only second-order judgments that can be said to have objects 
properly speaking; and this is because only these sorts of act relate to 
something in such a way that that it is appropriate to say of the relatum that 
it is known, or believed, or assented to. After all, only second-order 
judgments relate to something true (i.e. truth-bearing). As he explains, “the 
second [namely, reflexive] sort of [judgment] is an act of assenting by 
which I assent to something in such a way that the act of assenting does 
bear a relation to something—as it does when I assent to or dissent from a 
mental sentence.”57 Thus, for Ockham the question about objects of 
judgment is closely tied to questions about the nature of truth-bearers; only 
                                                 
55
  To some extent, therefore, my reading of Chatton diverges from that offered by Rondo 
Keele (2003), who claims that while “Chatton does sometimes drift over to talking about 
the signification of [mental] propositions …it would be wrong to view Chatton’s goal in 
q.1, a.1 as establishing or defending a res-theory as an answer to [this] question...” (48) 
Indeed, according to Keele, Chatton “has a small theoretical contribution on [the] question 
[about the significates of mental sentences] primarily because his interest in [that] question 
…was quite low.” (40) Although, I would concur with Keele’s contention that (a) we must 
look beyond q.1, a.1 for a complete understanding of Chatton’s account and (b) the 
complete account will ultimately show that Chatton takes ‘res’—namely, individual 
substances and attributes—to function as truth-makers for sentences, nevertheless, none of 
this undermines the fact that, for Chatton, the question about the “significates” of mental 
sentences was of central importance. As I read him, Chatton holds that the significate of a 
mental sentence (and of the corresponding act of assent) is precisely that thing(s) that 
functions as its truthmaker. (Indeed, it is precisely the claim that his younger colleague 
Adam Wodeham attacks. See Brower-Toland, 2006.)  I discuss Chatton’s views on things 
(res) as truthmakers in more detail in my (as yet unpublished) paper “Can God Know 
More? Late Medieval Theories of Propositions”.) 
56
  As we noted earlier, his initial definition of judgment and assent is in terms of truth: 
“our intellect does not assent to anything unless we consider it to be true and does not 
dissent from anything unless we judge it to be false.” 
57
  Quodl. III.8 (OTh IX, 233). 
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what is true can, strictly or properly speaking, be said to be an object of 
judgment. 
Because Ockham and Chatton approach the question about objects of 
judgment with different interests and aims they arrive at different 
conclusions about what sorts of thing count as ‘objects’ of judgment. This 
same divergence in starting points also lies behind a second, and much more 
substantial disagreement between them—one having to do with the nature 
of objects of demonstration. As we’ve already noted, Ockham’s general 
approach to the issue of objects of judgment is tied to particular concerns he 
has about objects of scientia—that is, demonstrative knowledge or science. 
As we’ve seen, in order to accommodate the standard definition of 
demonstrative knowledge (namely, as knowledge of what is not only true, 
but also necessary and universal) Ockham argues that all acts (and habits) 
of assent produced by a demonstrative syllogism relate to mental sentences 
as object. Despite all the other changes he makes to his early theory of 
judgment, this is a claim he retains. Thus, even in his most mature writings, 
Ockham insists that “the science (scientia) of nature is not about corruptible 
and generable things or about natural substances… rather, properly speaking, 
natural science is about intentions in the mind which are common to 
[external] things and which stand precisely for such things…”58 What this 
means for his mature theory of judgment is that demonstrative knowledge 
turns out to be a type of reflexive judgment—as Ockham himself explicitly 
points out:  
 
speaking about the second [namely, a reflexive] sort of knowing or assenting, I 
claim that such an act is a propositional act that properly speaking has a mental 
sentence as its object. … And it is this sort of act that philosophers are commonly 
speaking of. For they claim that the effect of a demonstration is a habit that relates 
to a conclusion. Consequently, the act corresponding to that habit is an act that 
relates to a conclusion as its object. Philosophers also claim that nothing is known 
except what is true, and they are speaking of a mental sentence. They also claim 
that a demonstrative science is based on first and true principles. Therefore, only 
what is true is an object of a science.59 
 
Here Ockham draws on his new distinction between reflexive and non-
reflexive judgments (which, as we’ve seen, he takes from Chatton) in order 
to defend his early view about objects of demonstration. For, by restricting 
demonstration to reflexive acts of judgment, he is able to retain his original 
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  Expos.Phys., Prol. (OPh IV, 11). Cf. SL III-2, qq. 1-12 (OPh I, 505-526).  
59
  Quodl. III. 8 (OTh IX, 234). 
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claim that demonstrative knowledge relates to mental sentences as object 
and in this way accommodate the strictures of demonstrative science within 
his nominalist ontology. 
Ockham’s final position on objects of demonstration stands in stark 
contrast to Chatton’s. For, throughout his discussion in q.1, a.1 Chatton 
makes clear that acts of demonstration can be non-reflexive in nature. For, 
as he sees it, 
 
it suffices for an act of knowing that the intellect demonstrates. And, as a result, 
even if neither the demonstration nor any of its parts is apprehended through a 
reflexive act, still that demonstration would exist, and would no less cause an act of 
assenting.60  
 
Although demonstrative knowledge is the result of the formation in the 
intellect of a demonstrative syllogism, Chatton does not think demonstrative 
knowledge requires any second-order awareness of the syllogism—its 
premises or its conclusions. Indeed, on his view, it is perfectly possible for 
us to syllogize non-reflexively and so perfectly possible for us to have acts 
of scientific knowledge that relate to things in extramental reality. As he 
explains, “when someone demonstrates, that is, forms a demonstration that 
does not signify things in the mind, but rather things outside the mind … the 
external thing (whether one or many) which is signified by the conclusion is 
the object of the assent.” As opposed to Ockham, therefore, Chatton holds 
that demonstrative knowledge can be a first order act and, therefore, like 
any other act of judgment, can have some extramental thing as its object. 
These various points of disagreement between Ockham and Chatton 
regarding objects of judgment are significant not only because they mark 
the differences in their own positions, but also because they serve as starting 
point for subsequent debates about objects of judgment. Indeed, the 
differences that remain between Ockham and Chatton provide a good deal 
of fodder for later discussions. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than 
in the writings of Ockham and Chatton’s immediate contemporaries and 
successors at Oxford. For thinkers such as Adam Wodeham, William 
Crathorn, Robert Holcot the positions marked out by Ockham and Chatton 
provide the main dialectical alternatives in terms of which the debate as a 
whole is framed—such authors either explicitly side with one or the other or 
else present themselves as attempt to develop some middle ground between 
                                                 
60
  Prol., q.1, a.1, 21. 
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the two.61 And even beyond this immediate sphere of influence, the debate 
between Ockham and Chatton has a role in shaping the direction of the 
debate. As the debate about objects of judicative attitudes unfolds in the mid 
and latter half of the fourteenth century, the two issues which come to 
occupy the center of the discussion are precisely those which come to the 
fore in the debate between Ockham and Chatton: namely, the question of 
the nature of the objects of Aristotelian demonstrative knowledge, and the 
question about the nature of the entities “signified” by propositional 
expressions.62 Although Ockham and Chatton are not the first to consider 
these issues, their treatment of them seems to lend new momentum to the 
discussion.  
 
3.2 Acts of Judgment: I want to call attention to one further difference 
between Ockham and Chatton’s respective accounts of judgment. Here, the 
difference has to do not with their views about objects of judgment, but 
rather with they way in which each conceives of the act of judging itself. As 
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  Thus, for example, Wodeham who commences his Lectura Secunda (D.1, q.1, a.1) with 
a question about the nature of objects of scientia, opens his discussion with the following 
question: “I ask first whether the act of knowledge (scientia) has as its immediate object 
things (res) or signs (signum)—that is, whether it has a sentence in the mind [as object] or 
the things signified by the sentence.” (Wodeham 1990, 180) Although he doesn’t name 
Chatton and Ockham explicitly here, he does mention them later on in the discussion. 
Similarly, Robert Holcot (d. 1349) opens his Quodlibet I.6, which focuses on a question 
about objects of God’s knowledge, by rehearsing Ockham and Chatton’s views on the 
question of objects of knowledge generally. “There is,” he says, “uncertainty regarding 
what should be said to be known as object. One view, namely, Ockham’s, is that only a 
mental sentence is known. Another view, namely, Chatton’s, is that the object of an act of 
knowing or believing is not a sentence but the thing signified by the sentence.” See, Holcot 
1971, 3. Crathorn too frames his discussion on objects of scientia as a question about 
whether such objects are sentences (complexa) or things (res). See Crathorn 1988, 269-306. 
For further discussion of these figures see Tachau 1987; Nuchelmans 1973, chs. 12-13; 
Grassi 1990; Zupko 1994; Karger 1995; Brower-Toland 2002, chs. 4-5; and Brower-
Toland, 2006).  
62
  Wodeham, for example, considers both issues in a single question—he argues that the 
object of demonstrative scientia is something that is only “complexe significabile” (that is, 
something that can only be signified by a complex, sentential expression). A number of 
thinkers after Wodeham take an interest specifically in questions about the nature of the 
entities that are complexe significabile (i.e. signified by sentences). This debate clearly has 
its roots in the debate between Ockham and Chatton—in particular, in Chatton’s focus on 
questions about the significate of mental sentences. For discussion of the development of 
the later fourteenth-century discussion of objects of scientia and of complexe significabilia 
see Kretzmann 1970; Nuchelmans 1973, chs. 14-16; Nuchelmans 1980 ch. 4; Zupko, 1994, 
Cesalli 2002; Gaskin 2003; and Conti 2004. 
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will become clear, the disagreement between them on this issue is far less 
conspicuous; neither Ockham nor Chatton ever explicitly remark on it, and 
perhaps didn’t even clearly recognize it. Nonetheless, I think we can detect 
a difference in way in which each conceives of, and so characterizes, the 
intentionality associated with acts of judgment.  
Recall that both Ockham and Chatton assume that every judgment is 
caused by a (logically) prior apprehension.  Despite their shared 
commitment to this assumption, Ockham allows that it would be possible 
for God act directly on the intellect to produce an act of judgment—without 
any prior act of apprehension. For, as he explains,  
 
one should not deny of any absolute thing that it can exist by divine power apart from 
another absolute thing, which is really distinct from it unless some evident 
contradiction arises. But there appears to be no evident contradiction in thinking that 
the judgment that follows an apprehension could exist even though the apprehension 
does not.63 
 
Interestingly, however, Ockham goes on immediately after this to argue that 
while an act of judgment can occur in the absence of a distinct act of 
apprehension, it is, nevertheless, impossible for a judgment to occur without 
any apprehension whatsoever. As he says: “it is not a contradiction for an 
intellect to assent to a mental sentence without apprehending it by an act of 
apprehension really distinct from that assent; nevertheless, it can be 
conceded that assenting without apprehension of any sort does involve a 
contradiction.”64 This is because, as he immediately goes on to add, “assent 
is itself a certain sort of apprehension.”65  His point, I take it, is that acts of 
judging, just like acts of apprehending, are fully representational states. 
That is to say, they are intellective acts or states that are of or about 
something—states in which something is thought or “apprehended.” Thus, 
it is impossible for there to be an act of assent without apprehension at all 
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  Ord. Prol. Q.1 (OTh I, 59). 
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  Ibid. 
65
  Ibid. Although the texts on which I’m relying here are early, there is no indication that 
Ockham changes his mind about this. Indeed, in his discussion of judgment in the 
Quodlibetal Questions, Ockham explicitly re-iterates his early claim that “every act of 
assenting is an act of apprehension” at a couple of points. (See, OTh IX, 234, 311)  And, in 
his mature account of the ordering among acts of judgment vis-à-vis apprehension (namely, 
in Quodlibet IV.16), Ockham continues to emphasize that acts of judging presuppose the 
prior occurrence only “naturally speaking”—that is, only in cases where God’s influence is 
not under consideration.  
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since, on his view, this would be tantamount to saying that an act of 
judgment can be devoid of intentionality. 
For Ockham, therefore, judgment is a type of apprehension insofar as it 
is itself a fully representational act or state. An act of judgment is 
propositional in content in just the way propositional apprehensions (i.e. 
mental sentences) are. In fact, at one point, Ockham explicitly refers to acts 
of assent as “propositional” (complex) acts—much in the way he 
characterizes those propositional acts of apprehension with which he 
identifies mental sentences.66 It would appear, therefore, that the only 
difference between apprehension and judgment, on his view, has to do with 
the force associated with each: acts of judgment carry a kind of assertoric 
force not present in acts that are merely apprehensive. As Ockham expresses 
it, in judgment “the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives 
its assent or dissent with respect to it.” On his view, therefore, acts of 
apprehension and judgment are acts belonging to the same genus—for they 
are each cognitive or intentional states. Indeed, as he says, if “one asks how 
these acts [namely, apprehension and judgment] differ, I say they are 
distinct in species; nor is it unfitting for there to be acts of distinct species in 
the same power with respect to the same object.”67  
Chatton, by contrast, seems to presuppose a different view about the 
nature of judgment.  Not only does he nowhere indicate that acts of judging 
are a type of apprehension, capable of existing apart from the apprehensions 
that cause them, his remarks imply a rather different view of the nature of 
the relation between apprehension and judgment. It appears that, for 
Chatton, acts of judgment are not merely causally dependent on prior acts 
of apprehension, but are also dependent on them for their 
representationality—that is, for their representational content. In fact, some 
of his remarks in other contexts suggest that he takes acts of assent (and 
dissent) to be more akin to non-cognitive acts such as willing (and refusing) 
than to acts of apprehension. Indeed, at one point, he explicitly characterizes 
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  See Quodlibet III. 8 (OTh IX, 234). There is some complication here, however, for in 
Quodlibet V.6 he characterizes acts of knowing and believing as ‘simple’. It’s not clear 
what to make of this claim, however. In any case, it’s not at all clear that his calling such 
acts ‘simple’ counts against the interpretation I’m offering. For according to Ockham, a 
simple or “incomplex” mental act is just an act which is such that no part of it is itself an 
intellectual act (I take this definition from Panaccio 2004, 32). According to this definition, 
however, even mental sentences can be simple acts. Indeed, Ockham himself explicitly 
acknowledges this possibility. See, Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 6 (OPh II, 355-357) and 
Expos.Perih. I.4 (OPh II, 395).  
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  Ord. Prol. Q.1 (OTh I, 60) 
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acts of will as a type of assent or dissent and, later on in the same 
discussion, describes intellective assent and dissent as analogous to acts of 
appetite insofar as “what is affirmation and negation in the intellect is 
attraction and repulsion in the appetite.”68  
In the context of his discussion in q.1, a.1, Chatton’s most explicit 
remarks about the difference between acts of apprehension and judgment 
come in a passage in which he is explaining how, in the case in which one 
comes to believe an article of the faith, the act in which assent is given 
differs from that in which one merely entertains (i.e. “apprehends”) the 
article in question. His account here suggests that he takes the act of 
apprehending the article and the act of assenting to it to be not merely 
distinct numerically, but also distinct in kind. For, he says,  
 
the act of believing is a simple act, whereas the act of forming the article [i.e., 
forming a mental sentence stating an article of faith] occurs successively over 
time. Therefore, these acts are distinct. … The first premise is clear since if it were 
not a simple act (one that does not include many acts) there would be no single 
instant at which it could be posited. After all, a mental sentence (which does 
include many acts) is usually formed by a wayfarer in succession—in that order in 
which it is formed in spoken words (or at least it can be so formed). And so [if the 
two acts were not distinct] there would be no one instant at which the faithful 
person believes.69 
 
As Chatton emphasizes here, on his view, a propositional apprehension—
that is, a mental sentence—is an aggregate of mental acts: one act serving as 
the subject term, another as the predicate term, and a third as the copula. By 
contrast, the act of believing or assenting is “simple.” Thus, unlike the 
propositional act of apprehension that precedes and causes it, assent does 
not “include many acts” but, rather, in some sense attaches to or 
accompanies the existing aggregate this is the already formed mental 
sentence. As Chatton goes on to explain, however, “although an act of 
knowing or believing is a simple act of the intellect” and, so, not a 
“complex” or propositional act, he wants to insist that “it remains the case 
that it is a truth-evaluable (veridicus) act—as it is caused by means of 
composition [and division] and is such that it is not had prior to composition 
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  Earlier in the same discussion, Chatton compares acts of willing and judging in this 
way: “Every act of the will is willing or resisting since it is no less the case here than in 
other respects that any act of the intellect following deliberation is assenting or dissenting.  
For it is clear from the Philosopher that in the intellect there is affirmation and negation and 
here there is attraction and repulsion.” (Rep. I, D. 1, q.2, a.2, 40)  
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31                                           OCKHAM AND CHATTON ON OBJECTS AND ACTS OF JUDGMENT 
  
and division.” Indeed, on his view, the act is “simple” in as much as it “does 
not include a plurality of acts intrinsically.” Unlike other simple or non-
propositional acts, however, an act assent is such that it can exist only in 
connection with a complex or propositional apprehension and so will relate 
to that which is represented (or apprehended) by that apprehension. As 
Chatton is thinking of it, therefore, the act by which the intellect assents or 
judges is not, as it is for Ockham, a species of apprehension; it is, rather, an 
act that in some sense attaches to or follows on apprehension and adds a 
kind of judicative force to it.70  
In light of the foregoing, we might summarize the difference between 
Ockham and Chatton in terms of their respective ways of accounting for the 
force and content associated with any given judgment. For Ockham, 
judgment is a single act—one that possesses both propositional content as 
well as a kind of assertoric force. Chatton, by contrast, seems to analyze the 
force and content involved in judgment into distinct types of act, one of 
which is a content bearing act, with the other functioning as the mental 
equivalent of a judgment stroke. Thus, for Chatton, a single judgment is 
comprised of two distinct types of act: a complex or propositional 
apprehension and a separate act of assent “by virtue of which the intellect 
takes (asserit) the propositional apprehension (complexum) to be true.”71  
Here again, the difference between Ockham and Chatton is significant 
for understanding later medieval developments. Indeed, we can find in 
thinkers such Adam Wodeham—an immediate successor and student of 
both Ockham and Chatton—evidence of this disagreement and some 
indication of how it came to shape later discussions. Since Wodeham’s 
treatment of this issue not only appears to corroborate my reading of the 
difference between Ockham and Chatton, but also illustrates how such 
different conceptions of judgment made their way into subsequent 
discussions, it is worth considering briefly.    
Wodeham’s discussion of this issue occurs in the context of a discussion 
about God’s ability to directly cause an “evident” act of judgment. At one 
point in this discussion, he pauses briefly to summarize what he takes to be 
two different ways of thinking about the nature of judicative acts 
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 Cf. Reportatio super Sententias  III, d. 23, q. un, a. 3-4. Here Chatton is more explicit 
about the simplicity of the act of assenting and its relation to a mental sentence. In this 
context he explains that the formation of the mental sentence causes the act of assent, 
which assent has for its object that which is signified by the mental sentence which causes 
it. 
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  Prol., q.1, a.1, 43. 
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themselves. The first of these bears a remarkable resemblance to the view I 
have attributed to Chatton, whereas the second looks to be Ockham’s. Thus, 
on the first model, as Wodeham describes it, “no judgment…is an 
apprehension” but   
 
rather, judgment is only a certain nod by which the mind grants that it is the case 
as the mental sentence (or sentences) signifies. But for the fact that there is this 
nodding there would be [just] some apprehension concerning its being such and 
such. Thus, [judgment] is a certain mental concession or refusal that, according to 
nature, always presupposes and also co-occurs with a propositional apprehension, 
which when posited, one can grant or not grant as if mentally saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
or by hesitating. And according to this, such an act might be a certain act of the 
soul that conforms more to acts of the appetite than to acts of apprehension … 
Thus, if God were to cause such an act in us without apprehension, we would, 
inwardly, assess nothing by it since it is not a perceptive act. Rather we would 
remain totally blind.72  
 
On this analysis, judgment is not an intentional or representational state, but 
is rather more like a mental “nod” that, as Wodeham explains, “always co-
occurs” with a propositional apprehension. Indeed, if it were to somehow 
occur without being accompanied by an act of apprehension it would be, as 
he puts it a “blind” mental nod for the intellect would be assenting or 
dissenting (giving a mental nod, or shake) but not to anything. Thus, as 
Wodeham nicely puts it, on this view “no single mental act would be 
knowing [or believing or judging], rather it would be as much an aggregate 
of multiple acts.”  
On the second of Wodeham’s two models, however, an act of judgment 
“is itself a certain… apprehension.” Indeed, as Wodeham goes on to 
explain, on this analysis 
 
it may be said that this sort of judgment is a single act that is simple in being, but 
in representing [it represents] just as much as the propositional and the non-
propositional acts that are necessary (naturally speaking) for causing and 
conserving it—although perhaps it represents and signifies in a less perfectly 
manner than these. … For the two representative natures are of a different 
species—that is, the two acts belong to representations of their own species.73  
 
Here, judgment is conceived as a type or species of apprehension; it is, as 
Wodeham says, an act that “represents and signifies” things in much the 
way as acts of apprehension do. On this view, therefore, judging is not a 
                                                 
72
  Lectura Secunda, Prol., q.6 (I, 173). 
73
  Ibid. (I, 174). 
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composite mental state, but rather a single act in which one both represents 
or entertains a certain content and intellectively assents (or dissents) to it.  
Although Wodeham does not mention Ockham or Chatton by name in 
connection with either of these views, the resemblance to each seems 
clear.74 What is more, Wodeham’s discussion not only provides a nice way 
of summarizing the differences between them, but also shows how the 
dispute between Ockham and Chatton on judgment may well have been 
responsible for initiating a wide-ranging debate about both the nature of 
objects of judgment and the nature and intentional structure of acts of 
judgment. Indeed, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, questions and 
debate about the nature of judicative acts comes to the fore alongside 
questions about objects of judgment.75   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have argued that Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham find a 
target in Ockham’s developing views about judgment and that they play an 
important role in shaping the outcome of that development. I have also 
attempted to show that while Ockham’s final theory of judgment is clearly 
influenced by Chatton, significant differences between them remain—
differences in the sorts of philosophical interests that motivate their 
respective accounts, differences in the conclusions they draw about the 
nature of objects of judgment, and, finally, differences in the way each 
conceives of the nature and structure of judicative states themselves. These 
points of disagreement serve to highlight the nature of the formative 
relationship between the two. For here, as in so many other cases, the 
exchange between them provides an occasion for each to refine and sharpen 
his views—and, by so doing, to further the philosophical debate itself. 
Indeed, as we’ve seen, understanding the differences between Chatton and 
Ockham sheds new light not only on what is distinctive in each, but also on 
the development of the later medieval debate about judgment as a whole.76 
                                                 
74
  What is more, this issue arises in the context of a broader question in which he is 
addressing and adjudicating the differences between Ockham and Chatton’s views on 
cognition—in particular, what sort of acts are required in order for the intellect to form an 
evident judgment. It is, therefore, not unlikely that in rehearsing (and ultimately deciding 
between) these two ways of thinking about judgment Wodeham means to be addressing yet 
one more difference between Ockham and Chatton. 
75
  See Nuchelmans 1980, 90-102. 
76
  I’m grateful to Jeff Brower for helpful comments and criticism on earlier drafts of this 
paper. I would also like to thank Rondo Keele for helpful discussion of a number of aspects 
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of this paper (especially, issues surrounding the dating of Ockham and Chatton’s texts) and 
for his willingness to share several of his unpublished papers with me. I read this paper at 
the 2007 Cornell Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy and am grateful to the audience on 
that occasion for their helpful comments.  
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